On Dennis Schröder adjusting to a different form of advantage creation

Schröder’s adjustment process hasn’t been smooth. But he’s slowly starting to acclimatize.

The NBA’s tracking data provide a somewhat surface level understanding of how plagued the Golden State Warriors have been in terms of shooting — as if a December where they shot 49.5% on effective field goals (dead last over that time period), 33.3% on threes (26th), and 66.3% on restricted-area attempts (20th) wasn’t enough of an indicator.

But more than just the raw shooting data, it was the nature of the shots they were generating — and if they managed to finish such shots — that was more telling. On three-point shots designated as “open,” where the closest defender was four-to-six feet away, the Warriors took the third highest attempts per game in December (18.1). However, they were only able to convert 31.9% of those shots, good for a mediocre 21st over that time period.

Such data is most certainly supported by the eye test. Many an instance has been seen over the past month where a decent look was taken from beyond the arc but failed to convert — either due to untimely shooting slumps from typically capable three-point shooters (e.g., Buddy Hield, Moses Moody, Lindy Waters III, and Dennis Schröder) or defenses funneling those looks toward those they’d prefer to be taking those looks (e.g., Jonathan Kuminga and Draymond Green).

It can’t be denied that offensive execution (or lack thereof) has played a huge role in their troubles on offense over the past month, in which they’ve scored 105.8 points per 100 possessions — 25th over that period. But in the instances where they manage to generate an advantage and create a good look, the shot simply hasn’t gone in, whether it has come from the perimeter or near the rim.

Steph Curry hasn’t been spared from this team-wide malaise; one can argue that said malaise is a consequence of Curry’s slump, one that historically has had a trickle-down effect. Curry’s December was one to forget, not unlike several of his Decembers in past seasons. In 11 games, he averaged 21-4-7 on 47.1% on twos, 36.2% on threes, 89.5% on free throws, and 55.7% True Shooting.

It hasn’t helped that defenses have been figuratively doubling down by literally doubling Curry — nothing new for the Warriors superstar yet telling of how more emboldened opponents have been at letting other non-Curry Warriors take the shots and daring them to score. Based on the team-wide shooting numbers mentioned above, Curry’s teammates haven’t been scoring on a consistent enough level to keep the team afloat during Curry’s slump.

Acquiring Schröder was supposed to remedy that problem, but he himself has seen a dip in his overall shooting and scoring efficiency: from putting up 18-3-7 on 50.9% on twos, 38.7% on threes, 88.9% on free throws, and 58.8% True Shooting in 23 games with the Brooklyn Nets, his first seven games with the Warriors has seen him average 9-2-4 on 37.5% on twos, 20.6% on threes, 81.3% on free throws, and 39.5% True Shooting. It was widely expected that Schröder would feast on advantages created by Curry being next to him and thrive in second-unit configurations as the primary ball handler without Curry on the floor. That simply hasn’t been the case.

Which is why it was good to see Schröder start the game against the Philadelphia 76ers on a high note — and a note the Warriors expected him to write down as a finisher of created Curry advantages. Take note of this particular sideline out-of-bounds (SLOB) set against the Phoenix Suns the Warriors call “Twist,” in which Curry comes off of a screen to receive the inbound from Schröder, flips it back to Schröder who comes off the screen by Green, then waits for Curry to come off of the screen by Green:

Schröder’s defender takes the approach of trying to deny Schröder’s pass to Curry — in the process of coming off of Green’s screen. As a result, the pass is delayed a tad bit, which allows Curry to curl the screen and receive the pass below the arc, resulting in a floater that the Suns defense would take over a three, despite Curry making the shot.

Contrast “Twist” against the Suns with this “Twist” against the Sixers. Schröder still receives the ball and passes to Curry coming off the screen. But the different approach and coverage the Sixers play allows a different kind of shot:

Instead of taking the Tyus Jones approach of sticking to Schröder, Tyrese Maxey elects to stunt at the gap to help on Curry’s drive around the screen. That approach was chosen due to Joel Embiid playing drop coverage with an empty left corner, which typically requires an additional third defender — whether on the gaps or from the weak-side corner — to defend effectively. Maxey’s stunt opens the swing to Schröder, who promptly drills the three to punish the help.

The Sixers clearly put Schröder in the let-him-shoot category early on, which helped create the open looks he and his teammates have been largely missing over the past month. The difference this time: Schröder was making them, and the Sixers made little effort to rotate and contest hard, such as on this possession where the Warriors emptied the left side, set double drag screens for Curry with Schröder as the first screener, and Schröder drilling the three after slipping into open three-point space with Curry drawing two:

The notion that Schröder is antithetical to the kind of system Curry and the Warriors thrive in is a valid concern. But that doesn’t necessarily translate to a perfectly imperfect fit. New acquisitions take time to jell with a new environment, much more when that environment typically zigs when most other teams zag. Coaches can certainly help in the adjustment process by catering to what they do best and finding ways to mesh their skill sets with the team’s overarching philosophy.

Schröder is perhaps best utilized as a downhill driver whose paint touches create pressure on defenses to rotate. In that regard, when paired with Curry coming off of an “Out” screen to create movement and shift the Sixers defense — followed by a pitch-back to Schröder, after which Curry comes off of a flare screen by Trayce Jackson-Davis — it creates the environment perfect for Schröder’s talents.

With Embiid having to step up to cover Curry on both the “Out” screen and the subsequent flare screen, Schröder sees the opportunity to drive when Maxey takes a rather unfortunate route. The next line of help is an undersized Kyle Lowry, which opens the baseline for Green to cut and make himself available for Schröder’s pass.

While the story of the night is definitely Curry’s breakthrough 30-point performance — in which he shot a perfect 8-of-8 on threes and an even 100% True Shooting mark — Schröder setting an early tone through a healthy combination of advantage creation and advantage finishing certainly helped the Warriors break out of their team-wide slump.

In addition to Curry’s 8-of-8 and Schröder’s 3-of-4 on threes, Kuminga (2-of-3), Moody (4-of-5), and Waters (2-of-4) contributed to the overall damage the Warriors inflicted from beyond the arc (22-of-39). Finishing remains a sticking point for the Warriors, but if this uptick in shooting continues to be aided by sufficient creation of good looks and variance heavily favoring them, the opportunities to drive/roll/cut will increase — which will create more rim opportunities and easier finishing opportunities (hopefully) for the Warriors’ rim attackers.

Such scoring diversification will most certainly help Curry the most, whose finishing has seen a rather considerable dip, mostly due to a decline in athleticism and lift but certainly not helped by defenses selling out on his drives and not buying his teammates’ capability to take advantage. Schröder and the others — by proving that they can punish those sell-outs on a more consistent basis — can help their superstar age gracefully and create impact that will translate to winning.