Oakland Athletics labor acquisition in the "Statcast Era" (2016-21)
In which I dare to ask the question:
To what degree do the Oakland Athletics rely on building teams around "swindling" players from other organizations?
I recently saw a comment on this site that the A's "seem to lose more gems than they develop" recently. Is this true? I wanted to make this post to explore exactly how the A's thrift their way to winning seasons. Are they using more developed talent or less? I'll keep this introduction short because the bulk of this piece will cover the A's routes of talent acquisition. One disclaimer I would put up here is: it's tougher to judge these recent deals, since it usually takes a few seasons to see the real value of a trade. Especially since the A's have been in "accidental win now mode" since 2018.
What is gem development? I define it as getting value from the bottom shelves of other team's rosters, from finding holes and utilizing players better. Of course it is important to remember in baseball, sometimes a change of scenery is all that is needed. In 2015, "statcast" was introduced in big league play, changing the way talent and performance is measured on the field. In Dec. 2016, the League and Union signed one of the cruelest labor deals in history. The players knew they were rolled over a barrel and the owners walked away with a sweet deal. This has driven the last few years of baseball- rampant TTO and shifting leading to boring games. A cheating scandal and declining player salaries. In the midst of this era the A's embarked upon their only real rebuild in the past two decades. Here is a list of the A's Opening Day payrolls and W/L records, to get a lay of the land.
2016: 69-93 ($85 M)
2017: 75-87 ($70 M)
2018: 97-65 ($68 M)
2019: 97-65 ($92 M)
2020: ".600" ("$94 M")
2021: 86-76 ($82 M)
2016
We all probably remember 2016. It was bad! Although going back through various pre-season threads, there was a prevailing sense of optimism. I'm not entirely sure what about. The A's had a questionable ace in their sleeves, and lots of young talent at least a year away. And everyone still thought Reddick was still good, to the point that the A's were working on a contract extension unironically.
Drafted: 3 fWAR. Highlights: Ryon Healy (1.5), Ryan Dull (1.2), Sonny Gray (0.9), Bruce Maxwell (0.2).
Traded for: 11.6 fWAR. Highlights: Khris Davis (2.4), Marcus Semien (2.1), Sean Manaea (2), Josh Reddick (1.5).
Free Agency: 2.4 fWAR. Highlights: Rich Hill (2.9), Ryan Madson (0.5)
International Free Agency: -0.3 fWAR. Renato Nunez.
2017
This was where the tide started to turn. The A's were just as bad as the previous season if you ask me until August, when the Mattletics era finally began. This team ended on a high note, giving fans a lot of hope for a last place team. It is important to note that people get sour when expectations are baked in, so maybe it was no surprise to see slightly less optimism, but still a general trend toward it from AN. Then again, maybe this team just wasn't as snake-bitten as the previous clubs.
Drafted: 8.9 fWAR. Highlights: Matt Chapman (2.8), Sonny Gray (2.2), Matt Olson (2.1), Boog Powell (0.7).
Traded for: 14.6 fWAR. Highlights: Jed Lowrie (3.6), Khris Davis (2.5), Sean Manaea (2.2), Yonder Alonso (2).
Free Agency: 3.5 fWAR. Highlights: Matt Joyce (2.7), Ryan Madson (1).
International Free Agency: 404 SERVER ERROR
2018
This is the first decent A's team in this era, so the fWAR totals start to look more respectable. The players the A's drafted started to slug their weight this year, but almost all from the offensive side of the team. This is the start of a general trend where none of the A's rotation consists of players they directly drafted- although there are appearances of free agents who the A's drafted in another era.
Drafted: 12.1 fWAR. Highlights: Matt Chapman (6.7), Matt Olson (3.5), Chad Pinder (1.9), Lou Trivino (0.6).
Traded for: 27.5 fWAR. Highlights: Jed Lowrie (5.1), Marcus Semien (3.9), Blake Treinen (3.6), Sean Manaea (1.8).
Free Agency: 6 fWAR. Highlights: Trevor Cahill (2), Nick Martini (1.3), Brett Anderson (0.9), Edwin Jackson (0.7).
International Free Agency: 404 SERVER ERROR
2019
This was the first off-season for the A's in this era where they were actually good. How would this change their habits, at all? There was a considerable jump in fWAR output from traded players, but the A's also managed to get 6 wins in the free agency market. This is pretty unlikely, especially considering the A's had the lowest Opening Day payroll, clocking in at just $ 68 M. This team's payroll jumped up by $ 30 M, although the results were the same.
Drafted: 11.9 fWAR. Highlights: Matt Chapman (6.1), Matt Olson (3.9), Chad Pinder (0.8), Seth Brown (0.7).
Traded for: 30.4 fWAR. Highlights: Marcus Semien (7.6), Mark Canha (4), Ramon Laureano (3.9), Liam Hendricks (3.6).
Free Agency: 5.1 fWAR. Highlights: Brett Anderson (2), Yusmerio Petit (1.4), Joakim Soria (1), Robbie Grossman (0.8).
International Free Agency: 404 SERVER ERROR
2020
The year that needs no explanation!
Drafted: 3.5 fWAR. Highlights: Sean Murphy (1.5), Matt Chapman (1.2), Matt Olson (0.8), Lou Trivino (0.2).
Traded for: 12.5 fWAR. Highlights: Mark Canha (1.7), Liam Hendricks (1.3), Chris Bassitt (1.3), Ramon Laureano (1.3).
Free Agency: 2 fWAR. Robbie Grossman (1.3), J. Lamb (0.3), J. Soria (0.5), Y Petit (0.1).
International Free Agency: 404 SERVER ERROR
2021
The year that needs no explanation, pt. II!
Drafted: 13.7 fWAR. Highlights: Matt Olson (5), Matt Chapman (3.4), Sean Murphy (3.3), Seth Brown (1.1).
Traded for: 24.1 fWAR. Highlights: Frankie Montas (4.1), Chris Bassitt (3.3), Sean Manaea (3.3), Tony Kemp (2.7).
Free Agency: 0.1 fWAR. Highlights: Jed Lowrie (0.9), Sergio Romo (0.2).
International Free Agency: 404 SERVER ERROR
Since the pandemic/labor strife season of 2020 was an outlier, I have made this graph showing the % of these four routes of player acquisition based on the total fWAR count.
The A's have received 13 fWAR from pitchers they directly drafted and called up. This doesn't count players they originally drafted but traded away, like Anderson or Cahill, so it's a bit misleading. But that means the A's have received 53.1 fWAR from hitters they drafted, or over 80% of that drafted player contribution total! Remember, Chapman's career fWAR total is 20.2. The A's have traded for, or signed, 84% of their pitching production since 2016. Compare that to only 53% of their hitting production since 2016.
"Column1" was players signed through International Free Agency. It looks like an error here, but I couldn't tangibly count anyone except Renato Nunez. Notice how "drafted" and "traded" players rebounded from the truncated 2020, but the A's somehow got less fWAR from their free agent signings in 2021. Maybe signing inexpensive vets isn't the best way for the A's to operate. The gap between drafted and traded players peaked in 2017, but narrowed considerably between '19-'21.
Here is a pie graph of the A's total fWAR outputs.
There are obvious trends here. The Athletics have supplemented more and more of their team fWAR with drafted players especially on offense. But a majority still come from trades. Which makes sense- this was a rebuild after all, and the A's got made several savvy moves that paid off considerably. But I believe the data here proves that the A's are shying away from building teams through finding undervalued and underutilized talent on other clubs hitting wise. The A's continue to do just that for their rotation. Please feel free to post your theories or observations in the comments.
What about specific transactions, what the A's have "given" away versus what they have "swindled"? This will be for "part II" to investigate if the A's truly did win a majority of these transactions. Stay tuned for my next question: Do the A's lose more gems than they develop? For a poor team, every move counts and every mistake is magnified.